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Abstract
One explanation for large stock market fluctuations is its tendency to herd behavior. We
put forward an agent-based model where instabilities are the result of liquidity imbalances
amplified by local interactions through imitation, and calibrate the model to match some key
statistics of actual daily returns. We show that an “aggregate market-maker” type of liquidity
injection is not successful in stabilizing prices due to the complex nature of the stock market.
To offset liquidity shortages, we propose the use of locally triggered contrarian rules, and show
that these mechanisms are effective in preventing extreme returns in our artificial stock market.
JEL codes: C63, G02.
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1 Introduction
Stock markets are complex dynamic systems where the interactions between their composing
agents have a crucial role in determining aggregate outcomes. By fostering the emergence of
collective conformity, such as fads and social manias, these interactions can propagate small devia-
tions of individual behavior from the fundamental valuations to the overall market. The occurrence
of large fluctuations in stock prices can therefore be attributed to, at least to some extent, the emer-
gence of herd behavior. From this point of view, this paper offers two main contributions. First, we
∗Corresponding author. E-mail: galimberti@kof.ethz.ch. Phone: +41 44 6328529. Fax: +41 44 6321218. Cor-
respondence address: KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich, LEE G 116, Leonhardstrasse 21, 8092 Zurich,
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propose an agent-based model that accounts for the role of imitation in individuals’ decisions and
is capable of generating the large swings observed in actual stock markets. Second, we evaluate
the effectiveness of policy mechanisms aimed at preventing the occurrence of large fluctuations
caused by herd behavior.
Stock market crashes can have harmful effects on economic activity. Large losses of wealth
can induce lower levels of consumption, and abrupt changes in the cost of capital can lead to se-
vere distortions in investment decisions. Macroeconomic policy authorities should therefore be
interested in the prevention of such stock market collapses. But recognizing the complexity of
stock markets poses daunting challenges for policy making. Attempts to stabilize stock markets
with monetary policy and financial regulation raise several impracticalities. First, bubbles are hard
to spot and, until very recently, central banks were not inclined to respond to developments in
asset prices (see Blanchard et al., 2012, for an assessment of how this view might be changing).
Second, the experience of the recent crisis suggests that financial markets tend to innovate around
regulations and the nature of risk-taking changes as the financial system gets more sophisticated
(Edey, 2009). Another example is given by the Chinese authorities role and response to the 2014-
15 bubble and crash in the equity market, where “broad-ranging interventions [...] appear to have
increased investor uncertainty about financial sector policies” (IMF, 2015). In this paper, we ar-
gue that these aspects are typical of large, dynamic and complex systems that can self-organize
into a critical state where minor perturbations may give rise to instabilities of macroscopic scales
(see, e.g., Scheinkman and Woodford, 1994; Bak and Paczuski, 1995). One key issue is that such
extreme events cannot be predicted and therefore require a different paradigm for the design of
effective interventions.
We set up an artificial stock market with autonomous agents that interact in a two-dimensional
lattice using simple decision rules based on imitative and fundamentalist behavior. Imitation is a
key component for the emergence of herding in our model, and it can be motivated from different
theoretical reasons: Private information can generate incentives for a rational decision maker to
follow others’ actions in sequential environments (e.g., Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992,
and Devenow and Welch, 1996; Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2001, for reviews of this literature).
Imitation also can arise from social (Bernheim, 1994) and psychological factors that cause behav-
ior to deviate from fully rational considerations (e.g., Kirman, 1993; Lux, 1995). Nevertheless,
empirically, there is scarce evidence that distinguishes between these motives in real markets (see
Cipriani and Guarino (2014) for a discussion on the disconnect between the empirical and the-
oretical literature). To circumvent this debate, imitative behavior is introduced in our model by
the explicit assumption of a simple local interaction rule, rather in the spirit of Herbert Simon’s
bounded rationality (Simon, 1982).
As usual, prices in our model are determined at the market level in response to imbalances
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between aggregate demand and supply for the stock. Hence, the ultimate cause of extreme returns
in our model is oscillations of market liquidity, which is consistent with recent accounts of how the
2008-09 financial market turmoil propagated (see Brunnermeier, 2009, for a review). Nevertheless,
the emergence of large liquidity imbalances is not implicit in our model behavioral assumptions,
nor by its market micro-structure. It is the local interactions architecture of our model that amplify
clustered shortages of liquidity and have a significant impact at the overall market level.
The inherent complexity that these interactions prompt often restrict the feasibility of standard
analytical tools for realistic inferences. One solution is the use of the agent-based computational
approach (see Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006), where dynamic systems of interacting agents are com-
putationally modeled to facilitate generative explanations (Epstein, 2007). Because the estimation
of agent-based models is complicated by the lack of simple analytical solutions (see Grazzini and
Richiardi, 2015, and references therein), we developed an empirical strategy based on a goodness-
of-fit measure for the whole distribution of stock returns generated by our model. Specifically,
we calibrate our model to replicate actual stock markets data, which present distribution of re-
turns characterized by heavy tails, i.e., extreme returns are more likely to occur than Gaussianity
would imply. Using simulations, we then show that our model is capable of matching the empirical
distribution of daily returns of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) index from 1996 to 2012.
We then turn our focus to the design and evaluation of policy schemes aimed at the prevention
of sudden liquidity dry-ups. To that end, we conduct several counter-factual exercises using our
calibrated model. First, we show that an “aggregate market-maker” type of liquidity provision
policy is only partially effective for the stabilization of our artificial stock market. More generally,
we argue that a policy design that neglects the interconnections between individual decisions and
their scaling up to aggregate outcomes can be misleading and costly.
To account for the complex nature of stock markets, we propose the use of a system of trading
algorithms, or robot traders, as described in Suhadolnik et al. (2010). Robot traders have been
around for years, but used only for private gain. More recently, their use for high-frequency trading
has been the cause of intense debate on whether their effects are beneficial or harmful to the
functioning of financial markets, and how regulation should cope with the rapid pace of their
technological innovation (see the reviews by Foucault, 2012; Kirilenko and Lo, 2013, and Farmer
and Skouras, 2013, for an ecological perspective). Here, instead, we propose their systematic use
for the benefit of public policy making.
In contrast to the practice of responding to aggregate observations, our robot traders are trig-
gered locally to follow a contrarian rule in order to prevent stampede reactions caused by herd
behavior. To prevent financial imbalances we also introduce a self-regulatory mechanism to de-
crease the robot’s contrarian behavior in response to its individual financial position. Hence, every
robot has the autonomy to trade on the basis of its local information, but is also bound by its own
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track of transactions. Also, addressing one of the key criticisms to asset price targeting, the robots’
intervention does not depend on assessments of the stock’s fundamental value. The only require-
ment is the introduction of a parallel system of autonomous trading algorithms that will gather
information in real-time at key junctures of the market structure.
There is an interesting parallel between our approach and the role of independent assessments
in collective decision making. According to what is known as “Condorcet’s jury theorem,” named
after its proponent, the 18th century French intellectual Marquis de Condorcet, the pooling of
independent information held by multiple individuals can lead to better decisions than those relying
on particular dictatorial assessments (see, e.g., Grofman et al., 1983; Young, 1988; Boland, 1989).
In other terms, and nitpicking the popular belief that stock markets are sometimes driven by the
madness of crowds, we devise a “crowd of robot traders” to restore the wisdom often associated
with collective decisions (see Surowiecki, 2005; Landemore and Elster, 2012, for many examples).
The existence of interdependencies between the individual decisions, however, may lead to
violations to the Condorcet’s principle. When decisions are correlated, the effectiveness of in-
formation pooling through the majority rule tends to decrease (Ladha, 1992; Berg, 1993; Ladha,
1995). Clearly, this is the case in our crowd of robot traders – even though the robot traders are
devised to operate autonomously, the interconnectedness of agents in our artificial market can give
rise to correlated contrarian responses. To circumvent this issue, we further developed a coor-
dination mechanism that splits the robots’ action into two stages: First, the local information is
collected and pooled by a financial policy authority. Next, the decisions of the robot traders are
coordinated to take into account the general assessment of the market condition.
We find that the robot traders are capable of stabilizing the stock market and reshaping the
distribution of returns towards a Gaussian distribution, while the self-regulatory mechanism guar-
antees its financial sustainability. Furthermore, with the aid of the coordination mechanism, the
number of robots required to mitigate extreme events is substantially reduced, which means that
our approach requires only tiny perturbations to the usual functioning of the stock market. The
calibration of our model also evidenced some uncertainty regarding agent’s sensitivity to the ob-
servation of a quorum in the local neighborhoods, and our results indicate the relevance of such a
specification for the design of effective stabilization policies.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, we present our artificial stock
market model and describe the calibration approach we adopted to match statistical properties
observed in the data. Section 3 describes the liquidity provision policies we considered in the
counter-factual exercises of Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper with some final remarks.
4
2 Complex Stock Market Model
The stock market is represented by a L × L square lattice where each cell, indexed by i =
1, ..., N (= L2), represents an agent. Each agent holds a portfolio of money (mi,t) and assets
(ai,t). For simplicity, we assume there is only one stock being traded and that there are no short
sell constraints. Every period each agent has to decide whether she (or he) wants to buy or to
sell one unit of the stock. Agents are assumed to make their decisions concurrently, after which a
market clearing process takes place aggregating the individual demands and adjusting the price of
the stock accordingly.
2.1 Behavioral Rules
We model the agents’ decision-making process as a discrete choice, with the probabilities of each
action determined symmetrically and by merging two investment strategies: an imitative rule and a
fundamentalist rule. Because we assume symmetry, we can simplify the presentation by focusing
on the determination of the probability that agent i makes a buy order at period t, piBi,t, which is
given by
piBi,t = ωi,tIBi,t + (1− ωi,t)FBi,t, (1)
where IBi,t and FBi,t are the probabilities that the agent will choose to buy the stock based on imita-
tion and fundamentals, respectively, and ωi,t regulates the weight assigned to imitation.
The imitative component is modeled according to a local interaction rule based on the agent’s
neighborhood, where the willingness to buy is an increasing function of the number of neighbors
who have made a buy order in the previous period (NBi,t−1), i.e.,
IBi,t =
(NBi,t−1)κ(NBi,t−1)κ + (N Si,t−1)κ , (2)
where κ > 0 controls the intensity of the response.
Inspired by the literature on consensual collective decision-making (see, e.g., Sumpter and
Pratt, 2009), rule (2) displays a quorum-type response when κ > 1: the higher κ, the sharper is the
increase in the probability of adopting a particular behavior once a quorum of agents performing
that behavior is met in the neighborhood. Within the square lattice architecture, we assume agents
interact with their eight surrounding neighbors, also known as Moore neighborhood; a quorum
is given by a total of four neighbors adopting the same behavior. Furthermore, when κ = 1
the response becomes linear, and as κ decreases below 1 the response becomes insensitive to the
quorum: the probability of imitation presents an initial sharp increase to a mid-range value once
the first adopters are observed, but then remains around that level until a majority of adopters is
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Figure 1: Behavioral Rules.
(a) Imitation rule.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0.
0.25
0.5
0.75
1.
number of neighbors buying HNBL
I
B Κ=0.25
Κ=1
Κ=5
(b) Fundamental (solid) and weighting (dashed) rule.
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.25 1.5 1.75 2
0.
0.25
0.5
0.75
1.
ratio between fundamental and price HD= f pL
F
B
Ω
Γ=1
Γ=5
Η=102
Η=104
observed. These responses are illustrated in panel (a) of Figure 1.
In the context of the theoretical literature on imitation, mentioned in the introduction, our
imitative rule is not derived from rationality assumptions. In particular, notice that (2) implies a
naive assumption that the neighbors’ previous actions fully reflect their private information, which
neglects the correlation between the neighbors’ own decisions on the basis of common sources
(see Eyster and Rabin, 2010, 2014). Hence, the imitative component in our model follows in the
spirit of models of bounded rationality (Simon, 1982).
For the fundamentalist rule, we assume that the agent holds a belief about the fair value of
the stock, denoted by the fundamental value fi,t−1, and weighs her willingness to buy or to sell
the stock based on the gap between that evaluation and the stock’s previous period price (pt−1):
when the price of the stock is below (above) its fundamental value, the agent will expect higher
(lower) returns and therefore will increase her willingness to buy (sell) the stock. Letting Di,t−1
denote the ratio between fi,t−1 and pt−1, the probability that an agent will choose to buy based on
fundamentals is given by
FBi,t =
Dγi,t−1
Dγi,t−1 +D−γi,t−1
, (3)
where γ > 0 is a parameter regulating the agent’s response to the deviations of the stock price from
its perceived fundamental value. The different shapes of the responses obtained with this rule are
illustrated in panel (b) of Figure 1.
The fundamental rule in (3) can be motivated from the literature on predictor selection under
a discrete choice setup (Brock and Hommes, 1997), where γ represents the intensity of choice
and measures how fast agents switch between different prediction strategies. Translated to our
context, the interchange is between different investment strategies (buying low/selling high) that
have corresponding prospects of return. Other than introducing standard asset pricing concerns
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in our model, this fundamentalist component also has a key role in supporting the uncertainty
required for herding behavior to emerge in a financial market (see Avery and Zemsky, 1998). We
discuss this further below after introducing the price adjustment mechanism.
The fundamental beliefs are assumed to be determined exogenously to the model according
to a log-normal distribution with a time-varying median1, µˆt. In order to calibrate the model
to match the trend swings observed in the index series of stock prices, we set µˆt to correspond
to a trend estimated from the data according to a procedure detailed in the next section. The
dispersion of the heterogeneous beliefs across the agents is controlled by setting the variance of
the log-normal distribution so that the variance of the fundamentals remains a constant fraction of
the median fundamental value through time, i.e., V ar (fi,t) = σµˆt. Using conventional notation,
these distributional assumptions require that log [fi,t] ∼ N
(
log [µˆt] , log
[
1/2 +
√
1 + 4σ/µˆt/2
])
.
Notice that when σ = 0, agents hold identical fundamental beliefs, such that the only source of
diversity in our model comes from their interactions within neighborhoods.
The deviation of the stock market price from its fundamental value also plays a role in the
determination of the weights ascribed to each strategy. Here, we assume that the agents give more
attention to the fundamental rule as the distance between the stock price and its fundamental value
increases. Conversely, the agents will increase their reliance on the signal collected from their
neighborhood as the fundamental price gap decreases. This behavior is captured by
ωi,t =
1
1 + ηD˜2i,t−1
, (4)
where D˜i,t−1 = log [Di,t−1], and η > 0 regulates the agents sensitivity to the relative deviations of
the stock price from its fundamental value, as illustrated in panel (b) of Figure 1. From a statistical
mechanics perspective, Rule (4) can be accountable for preventing the emergence of degenerate
results in the dynamical system. In particular, the presence of positive feedbacks in the imitation
strategy in the form of self-reinforcing collective behavior (see Sornette and Zhou, 2006) may favor
the dominance of that rule in the determination of agents’ final behavior.
Thus, our behavioral assumptions associate two main variables to the determination of agents’
responses: the composition of their neighborhood and the deviation of the stock price from its fun-
damental value. The shape of these responses is illustrated in Figure 2 for both quorum-insensitive
and quorum-sensitive imitative responses. Although piB is strictly increasing in NB, the shape of
the response depends on whether κ is smaller than or larger than 1. The response with respect toD
depends on two effects: the fundamental rule effect, making piB strictly increase with D; and the
1The median is the appropriate measure of central tendency in our model, where the number of agents buying and
selling is the ultimate determinant of price adjustments, according to (5)-(6) below. Therefore, what matters for the
“aggregate balance” of the fundamental rule is the number of agents with fi,t below and above µˆt, rather than the
deviation of the mean of fi,t from µˆt.
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Figure 2: Agents’ Response Functions.
The surfaces represent the probability that an agent will attempt to buy (piB) depending on the number of neigh-
bors buying (NB) and the ratio between the perceived fundamental value of the stock and its price (D), according
to (1)-(4).
weighting effect, which turns the relationship between piB and D negative when IB is sufficiently
larger (smaller) than FB and D > 1 (D < 1).
2.2 Market Clearing
The model dynamics emerges as a result of the synchronous update of the agents’ demands and a
market clearing mechanism that randomly matches individual orders and adjusts the price of the
stock according to an excess demand function. Letting
Zt =
NBt −NSt
N
, (5)
represent the (relative) excess demand for the stock. The price adjustment is modeled through a
hyperbolic tangent functional form (see Plerou et al., 2002) according to
pt = pt−1 (1 + tanh [Zt]) . (6)
This price adjustment process can be motivated as the action of a sluggish auctioneer who at-
tempts to balance demand and supply for the stock (Chiarella et al., 2006; Lux, 2009). In spite of
this underlying mechanism, we assume that market activity is generated solely by its composing
traders. This is to say that, after the random matching between buyers and sellers is completed,
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any remaining orders will be unsatisfied. Obviously, other than for regulating the market aggre-
gate liquidity, this market clearing mechanism is also important for the record keeping of agents’
transactions and the evolution of their portfolio, tracked by mi,t (money) and ai,t (assets).
When trade is sequential, Avery and Zemsky (1998) point out that the presence of a price ad-
justment mechanism may hamper the emergence of rational herding in financial markets. Because
signals from the prices would temper the uncertainty that leads agents to act against their own
private information, there must be multiple unknowns for herding to arise, e.g., agents must be
uncertain about both the effect and the occurrence of information events on the value of the asset
(see Park and Sabourian, 2011, for more general conditions). Although our model of herding is not
explicitly based on rationality, and trade is simultaneous rather than sequential, the convolution be-
tween imitative and fundamentalist behavior in (1) also reflects one such case of multidimensional
uncertainty. Particularly, our agents are uncertain about the fundamental value of the stock (Eq. 3)
and about the quality of their neighbors’ information (Eq. 4). Hence, our heuristic rule of imitation
seems consistent with the requirements for the emergence of rational herding in sequential trading.
2.3 Data and Calibration
We generated artificial series of prices simulating the model with a square lattice of 100 × 100
agents. For every simulation, the lattice is initialized randomly with half the agents as buyers and
the other half as sellers. As an empirical benchmark, we use the daily log returns of the Dow Jones
Industrial Average (DJIA) index, corrected for inflation using the U.S. Consumer Price Index, from
January 2, 1996 to December 31, 2012, consisting of a total of 4,277 observations2. We also hold
three years of data on the DJIA index, from 2013 to 2015, out of the calibration procedure in order
to run an out-of-sample validation later on. To avoid sensitivity to initial settings, we ran our model
for 4,400 periods, and therefore discarded the first 123 observations for the comparison between
the simulated and empirical distributions.
Our model is purposely designed to simulate trading at daily or higher frequencies. In order
to capture the lower frequencies of fluctuations, such as temporary trends commonly observed in
series of stock price levels, we estimate the time-varying series of fundamentals from the data using
the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997). The HP filter is one of the most-used
tools for the measurement of business cycles. It decomposes a series of observations into a trend
and a cycle component as an approximation to a high-pass filter, where the maximum frequency of
the cycles allowed to remain in the trend series is determined by a smoothing parameter, λ. For our
2The U.S. stock market is arguably among the most efficient and liquid stock markets nowadays, which leads to
the question of how would the model work in less efficient markets, such as those of emerging economies. In fact, an
earlier version of our model (Suhadolnik et al., 2010) provided a good adjustment to Brazilian stock market data. We
leave a comparative analysis of our present model’s adjustment to other markets for future research.
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purposes we set λ = 30, 000, a value that renders a trend that is stripped of cycles with frequencies
up to approximately one quarter3.
The HP filter is also two-sided by design, which means that a point trend estimate is dependent
on both lagged and leading observations of the original series. Hence, our approach is geared
towards the view that the fundamental value reflects not only past prices information, but it is
also a function of the future evaluations of the stock. One potential problem with this approach
is that the symmetry of the filter is lost at sample endpoints (see, e.g., Galimberti and Moura,
2016), but here we deal with this issue by augmenting both ends of our sample with additional
data; i.e., the fundamentals are obtained by applying the HP filter to data on the DJIA index from
January 03, 1995 to December 31, 2015. The estimated trend, presented in panel (a) of Figure 3,
is then introduced in our model to represent the deterministic portion, µˆt, of the exogenous series
of fundamentals that agents hold for their daily evaluations.
To calibrate the model parameters, namely κ, γ, η, and σ, we ran a grid search procedure
for several combinations of these parameters, attempting to minimize a measure of fitness to the
data. For that purpose we adopt the two-samples Anderson-Darling (AD) goodness-of-fit statistic
(see Scholz and Stephens, 1987), which compares the distribution of the simulated series of log
returns to that obtained from the data. We also attempted to match some key statistical properties
of the data, such as the returns auto-correlations, both in levels and absolute values to measure
predictability and volatility clustering, respectively, and the kurtosis of the distribution of returns
to measure the relevance of heavy tails. Table 1 presents statistics associated to some selected
parametrizations4.
2.4 Model Dynamics
Overall, our results show that the best adjustment of the model to the data is found when the
response of agents imitative rule is approximately linear. It was possible to find calibrations with a
good fit for each of the three specifications of the imitative response, though very low/high values
for κ were found to provide slightly poorer adjustments. It also was evident that as the quorum-
sensitiveness of the agents’ imitative response increased, the parameter on the intensity of choice
in the fundamentalist rule had to be decreased to keep up with the adjustment of the model to
the data. Thus, our model captures a trade-off between agents’ sensitivity to their neighborhoods’
information and their perceived deviations of the stock prices from its fundamental value, though
the data and our calibration measures were not informative about this trade-off.
Our preferred specification is that with κ = 0.75, γ = 2.50, η = 750, and σ = 0, particularly
3The value of λ is calculated from the filter’s frequency response function (see King and Rebelo, 1993) for the
desired frequency at a 75 percent cut-off.
4Details of this calibration exercise are presented in Appendix A.1.
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Figure 3: Time Evolution of Data and Calibrated Model Series.
(a) Price indexes and estimated fundamentals.
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The return series are standardized to have mean and standard deviation equal to zero and one, respectively. The
model’s series comes from the following parameter combination: κ = 0.75, γ = 2.50, η = 750, and σ = 0.
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Table 1: Statistics on Series of Returns Series from Data and Simulated Model.
Series
Auto-correlations AD test
Kurtosis
Tail
Returns Abs.Rets. Stat. p-val. exponent
Dow Jones Industrial Average -0.06 0.21 — — 9.99 3.06
Model with quorum-insensitive imitative response:
κ = 0.25, γ = 2.50, η = 750, σ = 0 -0.04 0.17 17.67 0.00 4.57 4.10
κ = 0.75, γ = 2.50, η = 750, σ = 0 -0.05 0.49 1.18 0.10 7.31 3.27
κ = 0.75, γ = 2.50, η = 750, σ = 0.1 -0.80 0.61 28.15 0.00 2.99 5.94
Model with linear imitative response:
κ = 1.00, γ = 1.00, η = 750, σ = 0 0.47 0.38 43.70 0.00 2.79 6.24
κ = 1.00, γ = 2.00, η = 750, σ = 0 -0.06 0.54 0.66 0.18 5.98 3.39
κ = 1.00, γ = 2.00, η = 750, σ = 0.1 -0.64 0.37 27.55 0.00 3.00 5.91
Model with quorum-sensitive response:
κ = 3.00, γ = 1.00, η = 1, 000, σ = 0 0.14 0.67 48.69 0.00 5.51 3.23
κ = 3.00, γ = 1.00, η = 15, 000, σ = 0 -0.06 0.79 0.69 0.17 6.93 3.35
κ = 3.00, γ = 1.00, η = 15, 000, σ = 0.1 -0.38 0.13 28.07 0.00 2.99 5.88
Statistics are averages of 100 simulations of the model for each combination of parameters, only varying the random
seed. The two-sample Anderson-Darling (AD) test compares the DJIA series of standardized log returns to those
obtained from model simulations, and the median standardized statistic is reported. The null hypothesis is that both
samples come from a common population and the p-values indicate the significance level at which this hypothesis can
be rejected. The power law tail exponents are estimated according to Gabaix and Ibragimov (2011) focusing in the top
10% absolute returns.
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Figure 4: Density Estimates of Data and Model Returns Distribution.
(a) Mode of the distributions.
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(b) Tails of the distributions.
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Densities were estimated using the Gaussian kernel smoothing function. The model’s series comes from one typical
simulation using the following parameter combination: κ = 0.75, γ = 2.50, η = 750, and σ = 0.
for presenting a kurtosis closer to that observed in the data. Also, using the AD test, we are not able
to reject the null hypothesis that the simulated data and the actual data returns came from the same
distribution at the 10 percent level of statistical significance. A visual assessment of the series of
prices and log returns generated by this model specification is presented in Figure 3.
One remarkable characteristic of stock market returns is the presence of heavy tails, i.e., ex-
treme events are more likely to occur than implied by a Gaussian distribution (Mandelbrot, 1963;
Fama, 1965). This is evident in the data we used and our calibrated model seems to capture this
property pretty well. Figure 4 shows that our model is able to capture the data deviations from
Gaussianity at the tails of the return distribution up to ±5 standard deviations. Moreover, our
model is also in agreement with an established result of the econophysics literature regarding the
decay of the probability of extreme returns; namely, the existence of an inverse cubic power law
(see, e.g., Gopikrishnan et al., 1999) is confirmed by the estimates of tail exponents presented in
Table 1.
When the fundamentals were allowed to vary across the agents, our calibration also showed
a poor fit to the data in that it generated approximately Gaussian returns. Therefore, increas-
ing agents’ diversity of beliefs about the fundamental value of the stock is likely to dampen the
destabilizing herding effects coming from their imitative behavior. Such a result is in contrast
to a growing volume of literature where the diversity of beliefs is found to generate endogenous
volatility in the absence of local interactions (see, e.g., Kurz, 1994; Brock and Hommes, 1998;
Kurz et al., 2005; Branch and McGough, 2011). Hence, our analysis suggests that the effects
of heterogeneous beliefs on volatility can be conditioned by the underlying assumptions on how
agents interact, though we were not able to disentangle these features. We leave this issue open for
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Figure 5: Boxplots of Model Statistics vs. Data Across Nonoverlapping Subsamples.
(a) Anderson-Darling goodness-of-fit statistic.
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(b) Kurtosis of returns distribution.
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The statistics come from 100 simulations of the model with κ = 0.75, γ = 2.50, η = 750, σ = 0. Outliers, i.e.,
returns larger/smaller than the whiskers, are not presented.
future research.
One potential concern with respect to the calibration of our model is that of data-snooping,
i.e., the repeated use of the same reference data series for model selection purposes. In our case,
the parameter sweep using the DJIA data series to calibrate the model may lead to an overfitting
of the model to that series, particularly considering the large number of degrees of freedom in our
imitation-based model. Nevertheless, it is important to recall that our approach is not dependent nor
geared towards the model’s predictive ability; instead, our focus is on matching some key statistical
properties of the distribution of stock market returns, particularly those statistics capturing the
incidence of instabilities.
To enhance our understanding of the fit of the model to the data we look at some adjustment
statistics across nonoverlapping subperiods of the calibration sample (see Brock et al., 1992), as
well as over an out-of-sample period from 2013 to 2015. Figure 5 presents the results focusing on
the distributions of the AD statistic and the kurtosis of the returns distribution. Clearly, the statistics
show that the fit of the model is not independent of the sample period; particularly, the model’s
ability to match the DJIA returns distribution tends to deteriorate in periods of reduced volatility,
such as in the three years preceding the 2007-08 financial crisis. Whereas this observation is not
surprising, given that our model is purposely designed to capture the emergence of periods of high
volatility, we interpret these results as positive evidence that our approach is not severely affected
by data-snooping.
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Figure 6: Boxplots of Simulated Model Returns Before and After a Sharp Fundamental Shock.
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The statistics come from 1,000 simulations of the model with κ = 0.75, γ = 2.50, η = 750, σ = 0, and fi,t = 1.50 for
t = 1, . . . , 500, and fi,t = 1.20 afterwards. Outliers, i.e., returns larger/smaller than the whiskers, are not presented.
2.5 Role of Fundamentals
Due to our assumption of a smoothly time-varying series of fundamental values, the emergence of
extreme returns in our model is mainly driven by the short-run effects of local interactions. That
may give the mistaken impression that our model downplays the relevance of sharp fundamental
reassessments in generating abrupt stock price changes, such as in mass sells triggered by unex-
pected poor performance of the firm, or a sudden deterioration of the macroeconomic conditions.
In fact, an important feature of our model is its flexibility to account for these distinct sources of
disturbances.
To clarify this point we simulate the model with a fictitious break in the fundamental value to
see how the model behaves. Particularly, we run the model for 500 periods under the assumption
of a constant fundamental value of 1.50, a value chosen to match the median of fundamentals
used in the data calibration of the model above. We also adopt our preferred specification for the
parameters κ = 0.75, γ = 2.50, η = 750, and σ = 0. At period 501 we then hit the model
with an abrupt 20% negative shock to the fundamental, reducing it to 1.20. After repeating this
simulation 1,000 times the resulting model dynamics is depicted in Figure 6, where we present the
distributions of model returns over the periods that follow the fundamental shock.
We see that an abrupt change in the perceptions of the stock’s fundamental value has an imme-
diate impact on the model dynamics; in fact, the impact is initially stronger than the original shock,
with a median return of about -60% after the abrupt reassessment of the fundamental; these effects
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tend to fade away as time goes by and the market price resettles around the new fundamental value.
Hence, the break in fundamentals is synergistically magnified by the herding effects, leading to an
initial overshooting in the pricing of the stock. To conclude, an interesting feature of our model is
the presence of a holistic interaction between fundamental assessments and local interactions that
lead to the emergence of realistic stock market dynamics.
3 Liquidity Provision Policies
The emergence of extreme events in our stock market model is directly related to temporary short-
ages of liquidity for those agents willing to buy or sell their stock, i.e., imbalances in the aggregate
market demand for the stock relative to its supply5. We now introduce and evaluate alternative
policy schemes of liquidity provision aimed at offsetting these imbalances. Particularly, we look at
the interesting and realistic case where the aggregate excess demand cannot be observed before the
price adjustment process takes place. In these circumstances, the main challenge for policy design
is to find a good prediction for the upcoming imbalance in the market.
3.1 Aggregate Market Maker
An obvious tentative solution to the problem of liquidity shortages is the introduction of an aggre-
gate market maker. The idea is that by supplying the extra liquidity demanded by the market such
a market maker may be able to prevent the occurrence of extreme and destabilizing returns in our
stock market model.
With our timing assumption, the aggregate excess demand cannot be observed before the prices
adjust. Hence, we suggest that such a market maker will respond to lagged measures of market
activity. The aggregate excess demand in our model can be approximated as a linear function
of the market clearing implied return6. Using such an approximation, our rationalization of the
market-maker intervention as a response to perceived excess demand for the stock is given by
Kt = {Λrt−1 +Kt−1}+K−K , (7)
where Kt denotes the number of stocks supplied by the market maker at period t, rt−1 is the
previous period log return of the stock, Λ =
(
N +K
)
/2, and {•}maxmin is a truncation operator used
to impose a limit to the participation of the market maker. As a result, K may be interpreted as a
5Within our model that is a direct implication of our assumption that stock prices are determined by a market
clearing process that balances aggregate demand and supply for the stock (see Eq. 6).
6See Appendix A.2 for this derivation.
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measure of the magnitude of the intervention. The presence of the lagged term Kt−1 arises from
the additional demand introduced by the market maker in the previous period.
3.2 Self-regulatory Robot Traders
The channel through which the liquidity imbalances arise in our model has, by design, a complex
architecture due to the distributed effects of local interactions between the agents in this market.
Thus, we argue that an aggregate intervention disregarding the complex nature of the market is of
limited effectiveness for the stabilization of stock returns. To account for these local connections,
we propose a novel self-regulatory scheme based on locally triggered automatic trading algorithms,
or “robot traders” for short.
At any given period, the stock market model is now populated by two types of agents: human
and robot traders, the latter indexed by j = 1, ..., Q and randomly distributed on top of the baseline
model square lattice architecture of the market. We also assume that the robot traders are able to
collect information about the last period decisions of the human agents within the neighborhood
of their location. The distinctive feature of the policy rule of the robot traders is that they follow
a contrarian rule relative to such information. Also in contrast to the human traders, the robots
decisions are solved deterministically. Namely, robot j decides to make a buy order at period t if
it observes that7 (
N˜ Sj,t−1
)β[−aj,t]
>
(
N˜Bj,t−1
)β[aj,t]
, (8)
where N˜ Sj,t−1 and N˜Bj,t−1 denote the number of humans in the robot’s neighborhood who have made
a sell and a buy order in the previous period, respectively, and β [•] regulates the intensity of the
contrarian response, which is assumed to be a function of the robot assets holdings. Particularly,
we found that the functional form given by β [x] = 1 + tanh [φx] renders the effects of interest.
When the robot’s holdings is off-balance, for example aj,t is large and positive (negative) due to
successive buys (sells) of the stock in the previous periods, the contrarian response becomes less
sensitive to the number of human sellers (buyers) in the neighborhood. The solid black schedules
in Figure 7 illustrate how the robot’s decision is affected by its portfolio position for different
values of φ. Logically, the robot places a sell order if condition (8) is not observed.
The mechanism underlying the robot traders’ decisions is intentionally designed to counteract
the human agents tendency to herd. We advanced a similar rule in a previous work (Suhadolnik
et al., 2010). Here, in contrast, we abandoned the unrealistic assumption that the human agents
are directly influenced by the robots through imitative behavior8. This allows us to focus on the
7In Appendix A.3 we show that this contrarian rule is symmetric to the humans imitative rule.
8Results under the assumption of integrated robots are similar to what we find without this assumption. These are
available upon request.
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Figure 7: Contrarian Rule Responses.
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The solid black schedules represent the combinations of N˜Bj and aj for which condition (8),or (9) with θ = 0,
of the contrarian rule is satisfied as an equality. The gray schedules represent cases with coordination, setting
θ = 1/2, for different levels of CB , which stands for the fraction of robots deciding to buy in the interim stage.
liquidity provision effects that the robots have in the market prices, which in turn end up affecting
agents’ decisions through their fundamentalist concerns.
3.3 Coordinated Robots Intervention
Although the robot traders consist of a population of autonomous trading algorithms distributed
across the market, there is still a unique financial policy authority behind their implementation9.
That means there is some scope for communication and coordination among the robot traders.
Namely, the financial policy authority can collect information about the market conditions that
every robot can infer from their individual neighborhoods, and then alter each robot’s action in
a coordinated fashion. Such a coordinated intervention may also be viewed as a mixture of the
previous approaches.
We modeled this intervention in a two-stage process. In the first stage, the “consultation round,”
the robot traders solve condition (8) for an interim decision based on their corresponding neigh-
borhood information. The financial authority then collects all these decisions so as to compute the
fraction of robots that would be buying and selling without coordination, denoted by CBt = Q
B
t /Q
and CSt = Q
S
t /Q, respectively. In the second stage, this information is sent back to the robots
in the form of a multiplier that will determine their final decision of buying (or selling otherwise)
9In the case of the United States, for example, such an authority could be represented by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission.
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according to10
(
1− 2θCSt
) (N˜ Sj,t−1)β[−aj,t] > (1− 2θCBt ) (N˜Bj,t−1)β[aj,t] , (9)
where θ ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter that controls the degree of interdependence between the robot
traders. If θ = 0, there is no coordinated action, and, as θ → 1, coordination among the robots
grows in importance. Hence, in our model we attempt to find the right mix of independence and
interdependence between the robot traders by tuning parameter θ.
Furthermore, there are two additional effects to notice when this coordination rule is activated.
First, if CBt < 1/2, the multiplier on the left-hand side of (9) is smaller than the multiplier on
the right-hand side, and vice versa for CBt > 1/2, which implies that coordination will push
the individual robot’s behavior towards the majority interim decision. This is illustrated by the
gray schedules in Figure 7. Second, when θ = 1, the right-hand side of (9) becomes negative
if CBt > 1/2, whereas if C
B
t < 1/2, it is the left-hand side that becomes negative; i.e., in full
coordination, all the robots will follow the majority interim decision, entirely disregarding their
individual neighborhood information.
This idea of a coordinated intervention can be further motivated by the intriguing effects that
communication has on the pooling of independent information in collective decision making. By
creating interdependencies between decision makers, communication can facilitate information
pooling (Ladha, 1995) at the same time that it can also cause the phenomenon known as “group-
think” (Janis, 1982), where pressure to conform among the members of a group can narrow the
range of opinions and lead to the emergence of informational cascades that amplify individual
errors (Bikhchandani et al., 1992). A key issue in this context is to find the “right mix” of inde-
pendence and coordination between the individuals in the group11, which in our model is done by
tuning θ.
3.4 Market Clearing Considerations
The policy interventions we have introduced in this section also require adjustments to the process
of market clearing defined in the baseline model. To take into account the introduction of the ag-
gregate market maker and the robot traders, the market aggregate excess demand is more generally
defined as
10See Appendix A.4 for the origins of this rule as a linearly weighted response to the pooled and the individual
pieces of information.
11Nature appears to have solved this problem by endowing ants (Kirman, 1993) and bees (List et al., 2009) with
simplistic rules.
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Z˜t =
NBt −NSt −Kt +QBt −QSt
N +K +Q
. (10)
The process of random matching between supply and demand in the market also needs to
take into account the additional offers submitted by both the market maker and the robot traders.
Therefore, we also need to track the portfolio of money and assets of each robot, say by mj,t and
aj,t, respectively, and of the market maker, which can be traced at an aggregate level by mK,t and
aK,t, respectively.
Furthermore, we assume anonymous trading in our artificial stock market, so that there are
no asymmetries between the orders originated from the different agents in the market. This has
two important implications. First, the chances that a buy (sell) order submitted during a bullish
(bearish) period does not find a matching sell (buy) order in the market are the same irrespective
of whether the order originated from a human agent, a robot or the market maker. Second, robots
occasionally end up trading among themselves, which means that the intervention is artificially
generating some extra market activity. In spite of this downside for the robot traders approach,
anonymity provides an important safeguard against the possibility that the human agents uncover
the participation of the contrarian algorithms and attempt to exploit it for their own gains.
4 Counter-factual Exercises
We now evaluate the effectiveness and the costs associated with the different interventions we have
formulated in the previous section. In the spirit of a counter-factual exercise, we took our calibrated
model as representative of how actual prices and returns are determined in a stock market and
evaluated the effectiveness of the liquidity provision policies to prevent the occurrence of extreme
events in this artificial market.
4.1 Visual Inspection
We begin with a visual inspection of the results from one typical simulation of our preferred spec-
ification of the model. In order to evaluate the stabilization effects of different policies, Figure 8
presents the distributions of returns associated with varying magnitudes of the interventions. Tak-
ing the Gaussian distribution as a reference, the goal was simply to flatten the distribution of the
model-generated returns towards Gaussianity.
Clearly, the results in Figure 8 favor the robots intervention: panel (a) shows that although the
aggregate market-maker intervention is partially successful in stabilizing returns, increasing the
magnitude of the intervention brings no further improvements beyond that achieved withK = 500;
a different picture emerges for the robots’ case, in panel (b), where a 15 percent intervention
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Figure 8: Density Estimates of Model Returns Distribution With and Without Interventions.
(a) Market-maker intervention.
−3 −2 −1 0 1 2 30
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Standardized log returns
D
en
si
ty
 
 
Model without intervention
Model with 5% market maker
Model with 10% market maker
Model with 15% market maker
Gaussian
(b) Robots intervention.
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Densities estimated using the Gaussian kernel smoothing function. The model’s series come from the following
combination of parameters: κ = 0.75, γ = 2.50, η = 750, and σ = 0. The magnitude of the interventions are denoted
in relative terms to the number of human agents in the grid. The robots are self-regulated with φ = 0.1.
is capable of bringing the model distribution of returns very close to the Gaussian distribution.
Similar stabilization results are obtained when the robots are not self-regulated, i.e., φ = 0.
To assess the costs associated with the interventions, we look at the evolution of the aggregate
financial position of these liquidity provision mechanisms. Particularly, we track the amounts of
money and stocks accumulated by the purchases and sells of the interventions. Because we do
not impose short selling constraints in our model, the participants of the artificial stock market
can accumulate negative positions either in money or in stocks holdings. Nevertheless, from a
policy making, practical standpoint, the sustained provision of liquidity to the market by selling
stocks will require an equal amount of purchases in order to cover such positions. Hence, both
the accumulation of a positive or negative balance of money by the intervention policy may be
interpreted as a measure of its cost. To circumvent this issue, we also consider the wealth positions
associated with each intervention, which are calculated taking into account the stock prices.
Figure 9 presents the evolution of the financial position of the interventions for the particular
simulation we are considering in this section. There are three policy specifications to consider:
the market maker, the robots without self-regulation (φ = 0), and the robots with self-regulation
(φ = 0.1). The former two are plotted jointly in panel (a), and the latter is plotted in panel (b).
We reach two main conclusions from these results. First, the costs associated with the market-
maker intervention are substantially higher than those incurred with the robots. Comparing the
instances where both policies are free to operate without any self-regulation feature, as illustrated
in panel (a), we calculated that the maximum (minimum) wealth of the market-maker intervention
is about 70 (50) times larger than that of the robots.
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Figure 9: Evolution of Intervention Costs.
(a) Market maker and robots without self-regulation.
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The financial positions are obtained by simulating the model individually for each intervention, with the following
parameter combination: κ = 0.75, γ = 2.50, η = 750, and σ = 0. The magnitude of the interventions are given by
Q = K = 1, 000, and the self-regulated robots in panel (b) have φ = 0.1.
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Our second conclusion relates to the evident success achieved by our self-regulatory scheme
to control the financial sustainability of the robots’ operation, as illustrated in panel (b) of Figure
9. The self-regulatory robots incurred costs much smaller than their corresponding unregulated
versions and the aggregate market maker. Clearly, this improvement resulted from the robots’
ability to avoid the lingering financial imbalances at the individual level, while keeping up with the
intervention effectiveness at the aggregate level.
4.2 Averaged Statistics and Robustness
Given the stochastic nature of our model, drawing conclusions on the basis of one particular sim-
ulation may be subject to the effects of random noise. We now extend our analysis to account
for these effects by looking at averaged statistics related to the costs and effectiveness of the liq-
uidity provision policies. For robustness purposes, we also consider alternative calibrations of
the model with respect to the assumption on the agent’s response to their neighborhood informa-
tion. Namely, we consider the parameter combinations highlighted with a gray shade in Table 1,
covering the cases of quorum-insensitive, linear, and quorum-sensitive responses.
Table 2 presents statistics related to the effectiveness of the interventions. Particularly, the
kurtosis of the distribution of returns generated by the model is a measure that captures the essence
of our stability analysis: the closer it gets to 3, the closer the distribution is to the desired Gaussian
benchmark. In the quorum-insensitive responses, we can see that our previous conclusions are
statistically confirmed, with the robots presenting important improvements as the magnitude of
the intervention increases. But, this is not generally true under the alternative specifications of
the agents’ imitative response: There are some cases (gray shaded) where the intervention was
not effective to reduce the return kurtosis. However, notice that even under these specifications,
increasing the intensity of the intervention to 10 percent tends to bring the desired stabilization
goals.
The statistical results for the market-maker intervention are again informative of its partial
success. In terms of kurtosis reduction, we can see that a market maker restricted to operate at a
maximum share of 1 percent of the market is better, on average, than the same quantity of robots.
Besides, notice that the measure of volatility clustering (AC Abs.) tends to be lower under the
market-maker intervention. However, the downside of this mechanism comes with the increase of
its intensity, where we can see that there is no general improvement to its stabilization effectiveness.
For the case of a market populated by quorum-sensitive agents, there is evidence that the market
maker may even destabilize the market.
The statistical evaluation of the costs associated with the interventions is rather challenging.
Following our previous discussion, we summarize the financial position of each policy by tracking
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Table 2: Interventions Effectiveness.
Policies
Returns statistics, by agents imitative response
Quorum-insensitive Linear Quorum-sensitive
Kurt. AC AC Abs. Kurt. AC AC Abs. Kurt. AC AC Abs.
Without intervention 7.31 -0.05 0.49 5.98 -0.06 0.54 6.93 -0.06 0.79
Robots without self-regulation (φ = 0):
Q = 100 7.09 -0.00 0.48 6.66 0.00 0.56 6.78 -0.06 0.79
Q = 500 5.37 0.12 0.40 5.19 0.20 0.53 7.14 -0.07 0.75
Q = 1000 4.36 0.11 0.28 3.68 0.26 0.39 4.71 -0.05 0.63
Robots with self-regulation (φ = 0.1):
Q = 100 7.02 -0.00 0.48 6.42 -0.00 0.56 6.89 -0.06 0.79
Q = 500 5.37 0.11 0.41 5.32 0.20 0.54 7.35 -0.06 0.76
Q = 1000 4.26 0.12 0.29 3.56 0.26 0.40 4.99 -0.05 0.65
Market maker:
K = 100 4.84 -0.00 0.20 4.63 0.14 0.29 4.47 -0.16 0.44
K = 500 5.09 -0.10 0.19 4.71 0.12 0.28 6.94 -0.39 0.44
K = 1000 4.67 -0.29 0.21 4.33 -0.03 0.22 8.24 -0.47 0.42
Statistics are averages of 100 simulations of the model for each specification, according to Table 1, only varying the
random seed. Kurt. stands for kurtosis, AC for autocorrelation, and AC Abs. for the autocorrelation of absolute
returns.
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Table 3: Interventions Costs.
Policies
Interventions wealth relative to volume, by agents’ imitative response
Quorum-insensitive Linear Quorum-sensitive
Min. WV Max. WV Min. WV Max. WV Min. WV Max. WV
Robots without self-regulation (φ = 0):
Q = 100 -0.04 0.09 -0.05 0.14 -0.06 0.33
Q = 500 -0.14 0.24 -0.17 0.38 -0.14 0.74
Q = 1000 -0.25 0.32 -0.29 0.40 -0.17 0.52
Robots with self-regulation (φ = 0.1):
Q = 100 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.02 -0.00 0.07
Q = 500 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.23
Q = 1000 -0.05 0.00 -0.07 0.00 -0.00 0.19
Market maker:
K = 100 -0.30 0.73 -0.20 0.75 -0.21 0.81
K = 500 -9.15 28.10 -8.02 24.22 -8.53 18.35
K = 1000 -17.16 75.15 -15.98 68.81 -16.73 60.99
Statistics are averages of 100 simulations of the model for each specification, according to Table 1, only varying the
random seed. WV stands for the ratio between wealth and volume of the corresponding intervention, and the statistics
reported are averages of the minimum and maximum values of this ratio throughout each simulation.
the wealth associated with its money and stocks holdings. We then turn these measures into relative
terms calculating ratios relative to the volume traded each period. Finally, we average the minimum
and maximum values of this ratio over the simulations conducted for each model specification and
intervention policy.
Statistics on these wealth/volume ratios (WV) are presented in Table 3. Clearly, we again
confirmed our conclusions from the visual assessment of a typical simulation. First, the results
show that the self-regulation of the robots intervention is successful in reducing the magnitudes of
financial imbalances accumulated by the intervention in the three characterizations of the agents
imitative responses. One interesting observation in this respect is that the self-regulatory robots
tended to accrue profits under the assumption of quorum-sensitive responses. But apart from this
case, the distortionary effects due to the self-regulatory robots over the agents’ distribution of
wealth remained below 10 percent of the traded volume in the market.
Finally, the results in Table 3 for the market maker show that there could be a very high cost
associated with this intervention. Whereas in the case with a small intervention the distortions to
the distribution of wealth between the agents can vary between -30 percent to about 80 percent of
the traded volume, as the intervention intensifies, these distortions become astronomical.
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Figure 10: Coordinated Intervention of 2 Percent Robots.
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Statistics are averages of 100 simulations of the model for each specification, according to Table 1, only varying the
random seed. The specification of the robots’ intervention is given by Q = 200 and φ = 0.1.
4.3 Results With Coordinated Interventions
Overall, our experiments indicate that introducing coordination reduces the number of robots re-
quired to achieve our previous stabilization results, though there is a greater sensitivity to the
assumption of how agents react to their neighborhood. Figure 10 summarizes some of the results
we obtain under coordination, focusing on the case with only 200 robots, or 2 percent of the num-
ber of humans in the baseline model. Clearly, there is some heterogeneity with respect to how the
coordination affects the robots effectiveness.
For the cases of quorum-insensitive and linear-response agents, increasing the coordination pa-
rameter up to θ = 0.8 brings gradual improvements to the stabilization of the stock returns. Beyond
this threshold the coordination strategy may lead to undesirable effects, such as the generation of
bimodal distributions. A different picture emerges for the case with quorum-sensitive agents: The
benefits from coordination only start to appear for θ > 0.6, meaning that a tendency towards the
majority rule seems to work better under these particular circumstances. Hence, one key issue for
the successful design of the coordinated approach is the identification of which behavioral assump-
tion better characterizes how agents react to the information collected among their peers in actual
stock markets.
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4.4 Risk of Counter-Robots Developments
One potential problem with the approach of mixing the aggregate and the local interventions is that
it may increase the risk that the human agents uncover the ongoing policy and use such information
to systematically exploit the contrarian measures for private gain. Besides, unlike our public-
service robots, software-based traders have been around for years but used for private gain. They
have sometimes been considered as culprits for extreme moves in markets. Some observers blame
the first generation of robots for the crash of 1987 as they were the tools for delivering so-called
“portfolio insurance.” Currently, programs are far more sophisticated and responsible for billions
of dollars traded every day, particularly in the form of high-frequency trades. In practice, because
no one knows whether an order is placed by a robot rather than a human trader, the regulator can
only react in the aftermath of extreme events.
Conventional regulatory frameworks such as this have to adapt to circumstances that are chang-
ing too fast for regulation to succeed, and the robots have something to do with this. Financial
regulation implemented by the authorities are too conspicuous to succeed. It is in the nature of
markets that they will tend to innovate around regulations, and the nature of risk taking will in-
evitably keep changing as financial systems get more sophisticated (Edey, 2009). An advantage
of contrarian algorithms is their crypticness; by stealthily taking contrarian positions at key junc-
tures in the movement of stock markets, the advantage of the stabilizing robots over conventional
financial regulation is unmistakable.
Nevertheless, one cannot at first rule out counter-actions from the profit-seeking human traders,
which may even lead to catastrophic outcomes such as a biological arms race for the development
of the most sophisticated automated trading mechanism. Thus, it is important to devise further
mechanisms that introduce uncertainty about the form and the timing of the robots interventions.
One possibility would be to add extraneous variability to such policy measures, which could be
accomplished by turning the determination of the robot’s trades stochastic. Another interesting
extension would be to consider an evolutionary approach (see Evstigneev et al., 2009, for a review),
where investment strategies are allowed to adapt, and selection and reproduction forces could be
assigned to the maintenance of an appropriate degree of diversity. We leave these considerations
for future research.
5 Concluding Remarks
We developed an agent-based model of a stock market that, in spite of endowing agents with simple
behavioral rules, incorporates complex structures of local interactions that lead to the emergence
of herd behavior. After calibrating the model, we have shown that it is capable of matching some
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statistical properties observed in actual stock market data, such as the low degree of serial pre-
dictability; moderate levels of volatility clustering; and leptokurtic distributions of returns. One
key feature of our model was that periods of market instabilities were generated as the result of
liquidity imbalances amplified by the local interactions.
Our main contribution came with an attempt to stabilize the artificial stock market through
the design of liquidity provision policies. Remarkably, we have shown that an intervention in
response to the aggregate state of the market is only partially effective for stabilization and incurs
high financial costs. We argued that the complex nature of the stock market needs to be taken into
account, and accordingly we proposed the use of contrarian robot traders. These robots are spread
through the market to collect local information on the market conditions and trade autonomously
using a contrarian rule.
We showed that the robot traders can successfully offset periods of liquidity shortages and, as
a result, are effective in keeping market volatility under control. We also devised a self-regulatory
mechanism that prevents the costs associated with their implementation to become excessively
burdensome. Additionally, we analyzed the case for a coordination mechanism where the robot
intervention occurs in two stages: First, the robots collect the information from their neighborhoods
and communicate it to a financial authority. Then, the authority aggregates this information and
regulates a coordinated action. We found this additional mechanism to allow a substantial reduction
in the number of robots required for an effective stabilization.
Therefore, we conclude that in spite of the problem of predicting the evolution of complex
systems, extreme events caused by herd behavior may be potentially avoidable with the use of a
locally triggered intervention strategy, together with an understanding of the underlying mecha-
nisms of decision-making in stock markets. Of course, there are many open practical issues in the
way between turning our proposal into a realistic intervention mechanism, e.g.: Who will conduct
the robots implementation? Who will finance their operation costs? How to control their risks? At
this stage we can only foresee that the actual implementation of our proposed mechanisms shall be
subject to a great deal of experimentation to guide their actual design and feasibility.
A Appendix
A.1 Calibration Exercise
The final calibration was split into two stages.12 In the first stage, we simulated the model with a
gross grid of parameter combinations, and compared the associated evaluation statistics in order to
learn the relevance of each parameter. Apart from the return auto-correlations and kurtosis mea-
12During the model design stage, massive simulations were conducted.
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sures, we adopted an Anderson-Darling goodness-of-fit statistic as an evaluation statistic, which
was adjusted for the possibility of ties (see Scholz and Stephens, 1987, Eq. 7). This statistic was
used in two ways: in pairs, comparing the distribution of returns from each replication of the sim-
ulation against the data; and, in a multiple sample version where we tested whether the different
replications of the simulation came from the same distribution in order to check for the role of ran-
domness in the model. To capture the level of disorder in the overall system, we also adopted an
averaged measure of the entropy in our two-dimensional lattice of agents, which we attempted to
maximize in order to prevent the emergence of persistent clustering patterns. Following Wolfram
(1983), we computed a block entropy, with the block corresponding to the neighborhood definition.
The greater uncertainty about the interval of parameter values relied on the determination of γ
and η, which are both related to the model’s sensitivity to the deviation of the stock price from its
perceived fundamental value. Hence, we considered a broader range of values of these parameters.
The results from this exercise are summarized in the box-plot diagrams in Figure 11, from which
we can draw the following inferences:
Imitative response (κ): This parameter appeared to have small effects over the model’s sensitivity
to the other parameters. Most variation in the dispersion of each statistic occurred for values
of κ < 5.
Fundamentalist response (γ): This parameter presented similar patterns within each statistic for
γ > 5, with the fit of the model deteriorating for higher values of γ; we also found that
higher values of γ tended to cause degenerate results (the entire grid turning to the buy
or the sell state) due to its exponential effect; particularly, notice that the box-plots on the
AD statistic for the test that all replications came from the same distribution are below the
rejection line only for γ = 1 and γ = 2. This indicates that higher values increase the effects
of randomness in the model. For the auto-correlation of returns and for the averaged entropy,
γ = 1 and γ = 2 are also closer to the desired targets of low predictability and high disorder
in the lattice of agents.
Weighting rule sensitivity (η): Similar results were observed regarding the insensitivity of the
distribution of each statistic for η > 1, 000; focusing on the AD statistic and the return
kurtosis we can readily rule out η = 10, because it turns the model results on these statistics
insensitive to the other parameters. However, smaller ηs tend to bring better results in terms
of auto-correlation of returns and averaged entropy.
Diversity of fundamental beliefs (σ): Overall, the adjustment of the model tended to deteriorate
for higher values of σ. In particular, the returns generated by the model tended to the Gaus-
sian distribution as diversity increased. Our main conclusion is that the simplifying assump-
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Figure 11: Box-plots of Key Statistics from Model Simulations.
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The statistics come from 100 replications (varying the random seed) of each of the 900 combinations of parameter
values, i.e., a total 90,000 simulations of the model. Our calibration aims to minimize the AD goodness-of-fit statistics
(dotted lines represent critical values at the 25 percent significance level), to match the data in relation to return auto-
correlation and kurtosis (dotted lines represent statistics from data), and to maximize averaged entropy.
30
tion, which is that there is no diversity of beliefs about the fundamentals, i.e., σ = 0, is
critical for the emergence of heavy tails in the distribution of our model returns.
In the second stage of calibration, we constructed a finer grid of parameter combinations focused on
the regions around the values that performed well in the first stage. Namely, we focused on the case
of homogeneous fundamental beliefs, σ = 0, and evaluated the model for every combination of the
following parameter values: κ = {0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 1.00, 1.25, 1.50, 1.75, 2.00, 2.50, 3.00};
γ = {1.00, 1.25, 1.50, 1.75, 2.00, 2.25, 2.50, 2.75, 3.00}; and η = {500, 750, 1000, 1250, 1500, 1750, 2000, 2500, 3000, 5000, 7500, 10000, 15000, 20000}.
This yielded a total of 1,386 parameter combinations, which, after multiplying by the 100 replica-
tions, resulted in a total of 138,600 simulations. The calibrations presented in Table 1 were selected
from these results, which are also available upon request.
A.2 Market-maker Response
To invert the price adjustment function with respect to the excess demand, first notice that from (6)
the stock market log returns are given by
rt = log [1 + tanh [Zt]] .
Because tanhx = e
x−e−x
ex+e−x , this can be simplified to
rt = log 2 + 2Zt − log
[
1 + e2Zt
]
,
or
ert =
2e2Zt
1 + e2Zt
,
which, after manipulation, leads to
e2Zt =
ert
2− ert ,
Zt =
rt − log [2− ert ]
2
. (11)
Assuming rt is small, so that ert ' 1⇒ log [2− ert ] ' 0, we can approximate the excess demand
implied by a given return by a linear function as advocated in the main text. Substituting for the
modified excess demand of (10), and assuming there are no robots, i.e., Q = QBt = Q
S
t = 0, the
linearly approximated excess demand is given by
NBt −NSt −Kt
N +K
=
1
2
rt,
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which implies
NBt −NSt =
(
N +K
)
2
rt +Kt. (12)
The market maker is assumed to respond to lagged excess demand according to
Kt =
{
NBt−1 −NSt−1
}+K
−K . (13)
Substituting (12), lagged by one period, into (13) produces the final specification of the market
maker response function given by (7).
A.3 Symmetry Between Robot and Human Rules
Assuming that the robots behave according to a counter-imitative rule symmetric to that of the
humans, (2), the probabilities that robot j makes a buy/sell order at period t are given by
IBj,t =
(
N˜ Sj,t−1
)κ˜
(
N˜Bj,t−1
)κ˜
+
(
N˜ Sj,t−1
)κ˜ , ISj,t =
(
N˜Bj,t−1
)κ˜
(
N˜Bj,t−1
)κ˜
+
(
N˜ Sj,t−1
)κ˜ , (14)
respectively. Because the robots make deterministic decisions, they would choose to buy if IBj,t >
ISj,t, but because IBj,t ≡ 1− ISj,t, robot j’s decision to buy simplifies to(
N˜ Sj,t−1
)κ˜
(
N˜Bj,t−1
)κ˜
+
(
N˜ Sj,t−1
)κ˜ > 12 ,
(
N˜ Sj,t−1
)κ˜
>
(
N˜Bj,t−1
)κ˜
,
which is identical to condition (8) after substituting the exponents for the self-regulatory mecha-
nism.
A.4 Robots Coordination Through Pooling of Information
With the two-stages coordination approach, the robots have to decide on the basis of two pieces of
information: 1) what they collect from their neighborhood, and 2) the signal they receive from the
financial authority about the other robots’ interim decisions. Assuming that the robots combine
this information linearly, the probability that robot j will place a buy order at period t is given by
piBj,t = (1− θ) IBj,t + θCBt , piSj,t = (1− θ) ISj,t + θCSt ,
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where IBj,t and ISj,t follows from (14), and the other terms are explained in the main text. Because
the robots make a deterministic decision, they choose to buy if piBj,t > pi
S
j,t, and sell otherwise. I.e.,
robot j’s condition to buy is given by
(1− θ) IBj,t + θCBt > (1− θ) ISj,t + θCSt , (15)
but as IBj,t ≡ 1− ISj,t,
(1− θ) (1− 2ISj,t) > θ (CSt − CBt ) ,
(1− θ)

(
N˜ Sj,t−1
)β[−aj,t] − (N˜Bj,t−1)β[aj,t](
N˜ Sj,t−1
)β[−aj,t]
+
(
N˜Bj,t−1
)β[aj,t]
 > θ (CSt − CBt ) ,
(1− θ)
((
N˜ Sj,t−1
)β[−aj,t] − (N˜Bj,t−1)β[aj,t]) > . . .
. . . θ
(
CSt − CBt
)((N˜ Sj,t−1)β[−aj,t] + (N˜Bj,t−1)β[aj,t]) ,
where we used the definition of ISj,t according to (14). After manipulation we find (15) to be
equivalent to
(1− θ)
(
N˜ Sj,t−1
)β[−aj,t] − (1− θ)(N˜Bj,t−1)β[aj,t] > . . .
. . .
(
2θCSt − θ
) (N˜ Sj,t−1)β[−aj,t] − (2θCBt − θ) (N˜Bj,t−1)β[aj,t] ,
(
1− 2θCSt
) (N˜ Sj,t−1)β[−aj,t] > (1− 2θCBt ) (N˜Bj,t−1)β[aj,t] ,
which is identical to condition (9) in the main text.
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